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Fifty lint,, pllot_ (captains, first off:lcemL, m.I flight engtm,t,r_) fr.m
O different airlines wer(.,, tldndnlsturud a _ltl'ttctul'ed (lU(,_:)t.mmlre rc,]atlng
1:o future warninB systeln design and s(}]utJons to cul'rt?|l[ w{|rll_[tlg systt'm prob-
lems. This was followed by a senlantlc dit'ferellt II:l] to (d}taln a faetur
analysis of [8 different eockplt warning Slgna.ls {)11 sca]es .quch al_ |llformLlt_VO/
distraetJ.ng_ annoying/soothing, lla]f the plJotl:t rt, ct,]ved a delnonstraLlon of
the experimental text and voice synthesizer warning sy_tem_l before atmw_.ring
the questionnaire and the semantic differential, h e,mtrol group an,wcred
the questionnaire and the semantic differential first, thm, providing a check
for the stability of pilot preft_rences with and without actual exposure to
experimental systems. It was hypothesized that preferences for warning method
and cancellation method would vary as a function of warning urgency or pri-
ority and as a function of expected false-alarm rate. It was also thought _m_
that age and position flown might influence pilot preferenc,:s. There were no
si_nlficant differences between the two groups for overall preferences for
text and voice warnings compared to other warning methods, suggesting a high
degree of stability and reliability of pilot preferences for warning methods.
Warning urgency and expected false-alarm rate did produce slgn_ficant differ-
enees in pilot preferences for some, but not all, warning methods. Warning
urgency also produced significant differences in preferred cancellation
methods for some warning methods. Generally, the preference data obtained
revealed much consistency and strong agreement among l_ne pilots | concerning
advance cockpit warning system design.
INTROI)UCTION
There seems to be substm..lal agreement among member,_ u[ tht_aviation
community that current cockpit warning systems for commurcla] Jet transports
_uffer from a wide range of human fa(:tors design l)rob]em,_:.In a recent study
. by the Boeing Company (ref. l), funded by the Feder:ll Avi;ttl,m Admin],_;tratforl_
Vietengruber documented the warning systems in afr('raft flow vurrt, l]t tt_ tht'
fleet, lie found insufficient standardlzatlon of w;irnlng slgn;_l;_ b,,twet'n
*This research was supported by NASA Ames Research Cent(,r Grant
NGL-05-046-O02, San Jose State Untvorst ty Foundat ion Aec_,unt 02-01-'_4 ! 4.
IThe term "llne pilots" refers to p_ lots wh- regular Iv f Iv .,11;1111_'1t"ial
transport aircraft. It does not include airline check pll,,ts, c]livf I, il,,ts,
or instructor pilots,
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aircraft typos and owm for the same aircraft type between alrllnss. He also
noted a trend toward increasing numbers of different warning signals in both the
visual and auditory modes. George Cooper (personal communication), under con-
tract to the National Aoronautlcs and Space Administration, conducted structured
:interviews with foreign and domestic a_rcraft and avionics manufacturers in
order to document current philosophies and to identify specific guidelines which
might assist in improving warning system design. He found general agreement
that cockpit warning systems are Inadequate and may be adding to cockpit work-
load at times when this is already heavy due to additional demands on crow
attention. While general agreement was found for many 8uldellnos, the Cooper
study also revealed some major points of disagreement among the parties inter- -'
viewed regarding preferred methods of alerting, that is, tones, bells, voice,
alphanumerics, labeled lights, and tactile warnings such as the stick shaker.
However, a need for improved standards or 8u_dellnes was recognized.
There are a number of proposals that define general approaches to cockpit
warnings and assign particular alerting methods to particular hazardous condi-
tions. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) has a project paper (ref. 2) that out-
lines specifications for airborne audible warning generators. By assigning
specific aural alerts to specific hazardous conditions, they have attempted to
standardize the "meanings" that pilots would have to learn to associate with
each of the different types of sounds. They also recommend a visual annunciator
that would remain on until an existing fault is corrected. They provide for the
: possibility of voice warnings in place of or in addition to the nonspeech aural
warnings. The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE-7) Steering Committee on
cockpit design is currently working on design standards for future warning
systems. British Airways, in a paper for the International Air Transport
Association (ref. 3), presented strong arguments against the use of nonverbal
aural alerts, pointing out that such alerts are limited in the amount of
information they can transmit and often are startling and distracting. They
suggest audio alerts, preferably voice, for high priority, quick-actlon dangers
and visual warnings, color coded for priority, for all priorities of warnings.
They recommend that high priority voice warnings be noneancellable while pro-
viding for a cancel button for lesser priority voice warnings. Clearly, there
is no industry-wide con_lensus regarding the types of alerting signals or the
system logic that should be used for eockpiff warning systems.
One type of data frequently overlooked is objective measurements of user
preferences. All too often, experimental =vstems are designed and tested in
the simulator first, with pilot debrleflng_ Rfterwards. Perhaps this approach
is popular because of a belief that there is little agreement among pilots con-
cerning new cockpit displays and therefore little to be gained by asking them
what they want in advance. This deprives an investigation of the vast resource
• of flying experience of the pilots who are destined to use and depend on the
new system until _eX major commitments have been made to particular design
elements or types of systems. This study had the dual purpose of sampling llne
pilot preferences for cockpit warning system design and also providing data
that would be useful in guiding subsequent flight simulation research aimed at
; the determination of design principles for warning systems for air transport
aircraft.
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For this investigation, only U.S. Customary Units were used in the test
booklets; therefore, the equivalent vallms In SI Units are givon as fo]1owss
3/4 in.- 1.9cm
3/_ in.- 0.95 cm
IIYPOTHEgES
Some general hypotheses rQgarding pilot preferunces for warning systems
were derived from pilot debrieflngs in connection wlth previous research on
•_ Area Navigation (RNAV) CRT displays (reg. 4) and on voice warning system design
(ref. 5). Additional input was derived from flight deck observations made
during a series of flights as part of an ongoing collaborative research project
:, with American Airlines Flight Training Academy on synthesized speech displays.
During discussions with pilots on the Ground Proximity Warning System
(GPWS), it was observed that they seemed to have a generally negative attitude
toward voice warnings and used the GPWS to illustrate their opinion. This
observation was supported as well by various articles appearing in publications
written for and read by airline pilots Connes, 1975, and Rawlings, 1976 (refs. 6
and 7). However, when pilots were asked if voice warnings with extremely low
false-alarm rates would be acceptable, many responded that voices could be very
useful for high priority warnings if one could depend on them to be accurate.
= This suggested that pilots would not be pro- or anti-voice warning per se, but
would instead want voice only under conditions of high priority and low false-
: alarm rate. To test this, it was hypothesized that pilot preferences for warning
method would depend both on the urgency or priority of the problem signaled by
the warning and on the expected false-alarm rate.
Another point that pilots emphasized in the earlier discussions was the
°.: difficulty created by loud sounds and voices that continued during decision-
:. making and intracrew communication. The engine fire bell was frequently given
as an example of a signal that prevented or disrupted attention to the decision-
:- making process and masked crew checklist callouts and other important auditory
• events. On the other hand, pilots gave two types of comments about cancellation
of visual warnings. Some wanted to cancel all lights and other visual warningsi
. as soon as they occurred to prevent distraction from other visual displays.
:[ Others wanted visual signals to remain as long as the hazardous conditions
remained. From these observations came the hypothesis that preferences for
warning cancellatlon would depend on both warning urgency and on the warning
. method used (i.e., auditory, visual, tactile). In addition, it was hypothesized
that a limited priority assignment scheme for visual signals would satisfy the
majority of pilots.
It was also expected that age and position flown might have an effect on
_-i," pilot preferences for warning system design. However, no specific predictions
concerning these possible effects were formulated. To summarize, then, the
'i' hypotheses were that
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!_:i I. Pilot preferencos for warning method will depend on the urgency of the
i!/ problem _Ignaled and on the oxpected false-alarm rate.
:'_! 2 Preferences for warning cancollation will depend on warning urgency and
i: the warning method.
:I: 3. A limited priority assignment scheme for visual signals would satisfy
most pilots.
i!
./ 4. Age of pilots and crew position flown might produce differences in
>: preferences.
j',
i_: METHOD
•_ Often, when a pilot preference survey is proposed, resistance is encoun-
_, tered because of supposed characteristics of pilot preferences. In fact, these
_, characteristics, if they do exist, can be allowed for in the construction of the
measuring instrument.
First, it is often stated that pilots have too many opinions to be ade-
quately measured: "There are as many opinions as there are pilots." To solve
this, subjects were offered reasonable alternatives to rate or rank or were
offered forced choices among alternatives. In most cases, they were also
offered spaces for free responses where they could write in their own opinions
or suggest their own system, if they thought the ones offered were totally
inadequate. If this alternative was used by a significant proportion of
respondents, it would be evidence of an unmanageable diversity of opinion among
pilots, inadequate test items, or both.
Further, it is often suggested that pilot opinions are too changeable
because they conslder whatever new system they saw last to be best. This prob-
lem was handled by splitting the sample group into two subgroups and then by
making a vigorous effort to convince one of the subgroups of the usefulness and
potential of two types of systems, CET or voice, which would then be represented
in the test measures. Any significant differences between the responses of the
subgroups on these two systems would be evidence for changeability of the pilot
preferences obtained.
Measuring Instrument
The measuring instrument was a 32-page booklet to be filled out by each
. test subject. It consisted of 2 pages of biographical information and 30 pages
of free response, rating scale, preference grid, and ranking items. There was
a second, optional test, the semantic differential, in a separate booklet. It
consisted of Judgments of 18 concepts on 17 polar opposite scales. It was ohly
administered to subjects who finished the first booklet within the 3 hr allowed
for the complete session. If administered, it took approximately 15 min to
complete.
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SubJeet_
.qubJ,'et_were llm, captains (13), ftrsfiofflcers (20), or flight onglneors
(14) currently flying transport a_rcraft or recently furloughed (3). The
olOest wa_I 60, the younBest 27, with a mean ago of 41.3 years. Total time
averaged 9300 hr, and 8 alr]_nes were represented. (See table I.) '|'hissample
was not randomly chosen, and so may not represent a true cross section.
Procedure ._,.
Subjects were obtained in sets of 1 to 9 persons. They were drawn from a
pool of airline pilots based in the San Francisco Bay Area who had expressed
interest In participating in research at Ames Research Center. They were paid
for their participation. Each set was randomly assigned to treatments, except
that the last set was picked to exactly complete the group sample size of 25.
P#monst_tion-first _,toup- Sets of pilots who were assigned to the
"demonstration-flrst" group were offered coffee and a short, purposely vague
i_troduetlon 2 to the purpose of the study, and assurance that their name and
airline could not be connected to their individual responses on the test items.
They then participated in a 20-mln experiment that exposed them to synthesized
speech warning messages. Following that, they were shown a video tape of
various possible CRT display warnings, and then color slides of this type of
CRT system and another type of alphanumeric warning system in several simulators,
aircraft, and artists' conceptions. Finally, they were given the two test
booklets and allowed to work on them at their own pace, for a maximum of 3 hr.
Most completed them in less time.
Que_t_om,_o_Ae-fZ_t group- The "questionnalre-flrst" pilots were given
the short introduction, coffee, anonymity assurances, and told they would have
2 i/2 hr to complete the test booklets, after which they were given the syn-
thesized speech experiment and the video and slide demonstrations.
The experimenters were always present during administration of the test
booklets to answer questions. Discussions were not allowed to become estab-
llshed. If opinions were offered spontaneously, subjects were politely
encouraged to write them in the appropriate spaces on the booklets. Metivatlon
was good, and subjects willingly worked on the booklets without complaint.
Spontaneous comments offered at the end of the session were encouraging. All
subjects were offered an opportunity to fill out a name and address sheet to
receive a copy of the report on the study. More than two-thirds of them chose
• to do s,J;41 of the 50 also chose to do the optional semantic differential.
These are rough indications of good motivation and interest.
2The hltroductton was left vague to prevent biasing subjects. It any
particular system was even mentioned in a positive or negative statement, it
could have Influenced their responses.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSS JON
In the following, whenever a ru_u]t _s prescmt_,d oi:_ eonclu,_lulJ,rf,.r,.d,
assume that the "demonstratlon-flrst" and the "questlonnalru-f/rst" g*:,,ulm
were }tOt signifleantly different, and the data were combined after th,':_Jguli-
icance test had been run. The few Instances when there wal_ a s[gu:lllcant dif-
ferexlce are indicated. The tclmi "pilots" is used to describe any of the sub-
_ects, whether they were captains, f'Irst off:leers, or flight ,qW,[uu_rs.
Throughout this paper, there are repeated references to priorlty .-.
(= urgency) levels, I through 5. These were adapted from a priority assignment
scheme developed by the Boeing Company and were presented to subjects in the
form shown in table II. Warning methods are repeatedly referred to, and these
were initially presented to the subjects as shown% in table III. Subsequently,
they were referred to in an abbreviated form.
Warning Method Preferences
The preference grid shown in table IV was repeated four times, once for
each of four false-alarm rates: 50 false:l real alarm, 1 false:50 real alarms,
1 false:f000 real alarms, and 1 false:l,000,O00 real alarms. Pilots were asked,
for each of these rates, to place an X under the system or systems they would
want for warnings of that urgency, given that the system false-alarm rate could
be no better than stated. Results are shown in figure i. There is much
information in this figure, but it will reward close study. First consider
one cell concerned with voice warnings for priority i problems (fig. 2). Note
that with the high false-alarm rate, 50:1, few respondents will accept the
voice warning, but as the false-alarm rate improves, more and more pilots are
willing to accept this method of warning for priority I situat;ions. Returning
to figure I, the larger histogram, note, in the row for voice warnings, that
for the lower priority situations, the number of pilots desiring voice warnings
declines, regardless of tilefalse-alarm rate. In short, pilots do not want
voice for "information only" or low priority warnings, and they do uot want
them if the false-alarm rate is high. But they are willing to acc_.pt voice
warnings for very important, high priority warnings if the false-alarm rate is
low.
Now consider tilerow "text message." Note that *it is general]y acceptable
no matter what the false-alarm rate is, as shown by the evenness of th_ histo-
grams within cells. But also note the slightly greater cuncentration of
responses within the cell for urgency level 3. This would te,d to indicate
• that text messages are seen as more valuable for moderate priority itL,ms.
Two further observations can be made from this l'igure. For the auditory
warnings (top three rows), responses are concentr;Ited in the higlH,r priority
columns,indicating that pih)ts want sounds onlv Iov imlun't;,,3t p,ol,l¢.ms.
A X2 test for the effect of false-a]arm rat(, Is ;,Is,,,,,,,:;i::t,,t( 2 - 22.6,
df = 12, p < 0.05).
622
O0000008-TSF05
,I
:t I
i!;
Now consider vtminl dIsp]:iyf_. A r_,l;li, lvc, lil_,,n_.'Jl-lvlty I.,, I,'ll_;,,. ,,l:,il,
" rates and urgency level is shown. 'l'hefi,., rol-Ii,,inlu,fJ fnll;g,'lt 1.11;,,I vi>ual w,',ri, l,,w,
i"'
can be more easily ignored if they :ire a lalso ,,l];irm, nnd t:ll:,i II.,y ,,;,_i I,,
: ' ,,2
.._ tailored to suit the urgency of the sltual:l,m. I, I,,;_l,I _.1,.,-_. i,,,vf,_,,,,,.,I ,,i, IlJ,,
! : data for each false_-alarm rate to t_.,st tl.., rl.,l_itllm lit w;irlllllg ,,.tlJ_.l 1,.,
:." urgency ]eva]., For all false-alarm rate;_, tltglllflc:nlec, It,v,_,],; ,,r I, ' 0.0'; ,,_
;. better were obtained. Inspection of tim tabled d;:li.;t ,qliowed t ll,'lt. I_h,. ;lu<lil,,JyI,
methods, particularly "other sound" and "VO:ice_ were pr_lc,r','c_d fc,r l l., i,,_J,.
urgent warnings provided the false-alarm r;ltc, was low. V.t:ma] nlt.tliod_:, p:lr-
ticularly "labeled light" were preferred for moderate and le;.:.,J urgent w,'_cnim;:_ ...
for all false-alarm rates and were also preferr,,d for level 1 and 2 urg_i_c.y,
"action now" warnings when the false-alarm rate was hlgh.
_j, When differences between the responses of the "questionnaire--flrut" and
17, "demonstration-first" groups were tested on this item, none of the exp_-:ct,:d
ones were found, despite this being one of the most likely sect:ions of the
:!: questionnaire to show such differences.
•'_" Warning Cancellat! on
i '
:!iI Part of matching a warning to a situation is providing a way to cancel the
warning when it is no longer wanted. Responses were collected by means of
j_'L_ preference grid with cancellation options and warning methods, given dil ferent
• priorities. The results are shown in figure 3. For clarity, one cell i_ sho_rn
in figure 4, voice warnings for priorities I and 2. (For brevity on the ques-
._/>,
i, _ionnaire, priorities 1 and 2 were combined as were priorities 3 and 4.) For
these, "cancel button" is the method most preferred, and this is a general4
'.; finding.
I
Note the very small number of "noncancellable" responses, whrich _ndicates
}" that the respondents do want to be able to cancel a w)ice warning. Th_s i,,;
t" true for nearly all auditory war:ings. Also, few subjects checked "don't ,me,"
for this warning method, for this priority, indicating that they do find voice
warnings acceptable. Figure 3 also shows that "noncancellable" is very fre-
quently checked for lights, text messages, and flags; therefore they should
stay on until the problem is solved. When X2 tests were applied to re_st for
a statistically significant relation between urgency and cancellat_on pref,,r.-
ences, they were significantly related (p < 0.001) for auditory walrn.lng method:;
but not for visual methods (p > 0.20).
Finally, figure 3 shows that as prior:Ity decreases, there are m;my mo_:e.
"donlt use" responses for oudlo displays, the trend being rever,led ,or
unlabeled lights and flags.
I• System l,ogic
i!i Another question :it tsstie in the dc',_;i_',i_ _,t w_l'nin_: v_y_;tc,m_: |:; th, ;,:;_:il',i,-.
, sent of priorities for the warnings aim f|lt,,r|ng or inll.il_il, ing tilt,m, Tlli
• Y,
i >'>
: A,.
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pr()bll,m w, lt-_ m+',;,,s+_l'd iiJ tl. + c'<mi,,zl ,]l + ,+_ I_i+Jgli'++c'lmlml'l w,+.'nJ.g _+yl_t(_m l_|mt.
I,Imld llol, Pr'_,+,_l,lll. mll.lllplt, t_I..lll.mil'l.u', warlllllg_;. ]'l]+,t_; w4'I'++' mIk(,d Lu ral_t_
t+lit , I1_1 1,_w,lnf. llVl-,tl.ltl,_:
A . All {+nll)ll;I lid <'(_lllplll I'F d('C' l lll'_; ],1 l l}F i { V I I)l'('_;l'll t I+; till' llllJl'lt- Ll|+_+_Ll|lt wiqr[lin B
unt I1 l.ht, I'+ll'l_Jll Jell l:; rt+lllOVi,d, llll,ll plc'_H'lll_| lilt' II1,_:1+ lll{_!lJ+ I|Fl._l'l|t p t_l:(':.
P,. A prllli+ll'V dJpll) l,+i,S, pl+i,s,.illli II.' lli()lil Cll'+',,'llt %,]/lYli+lllJ%lq; +'I _-£tll_l-l-ld+i/iry dJH-
I+)llly l)l'l'P]t'l+tll ;my of]lot,<+; wl_l('h <_<,_:ttl" +:ltlul]t:.l(,c,tl,;ly.
Ill.
t:. Pr+lorll'l¢,++ +ll+'(' l+tl)t :i,_mlp, llt,ll .... X,1:ll'llJlIp, H ;Ire, l)ri,m,nll,d i_n Lho primary
d,ispl,'+y +.+; th+'y (u,ctlr.
I). A w,u-+l'tng is l)res(_,ntud ft,r .5 H(+'Ctilttlt4 till tilt. l)Fl.m:iry dlsplay then
repJnced w.[lh ;mother wartling, u, ltil all wnr,tlllpS in Lilt., stack are exhausted;
then the entire, th:[ng Fepe;lt_J until ,'+11 <,()nit it tons requiring warnings +ire
removed. All W:arnJllgS :irt. _ al,qtt dlt;p1;lyt.d tm :k sltl_;_ldl:lry display.
E. All onboard ('t)lllpltt+cl + alm lyzcs t lw l)attt.ln of wtll+llJngs) thell presents the
ur_t.w with tilt, bt_.ql Cotll+Str oF dt't.[oll in ('tlllllll_llld ft_l+:_htL.
Two primary display systems wt,l+t + to bc c_)nstdurL, d - an "alphanumeric display
block of '+/4-dn.-h:lgh lettars "3 or a "syntht,++izod wdct, display in earphones and
sl)eakers." R(,sults arc prest,nted -in f:igure 5. In all cases, the visual warning
was sllght]y more desirable. System I+,J,,+tilt+c]t,ar f_worlte. The other systems
llave mean ratings of 3, "no preforeuce" or wet:so, so the ])i]ots seem to indicate
that they do not like any of these other systems very much. Clearly, more
thought must be given to priority _],_,+'ignmentachemes; perhaps system B could be
used as a starl it}g point.
Text l)jsp]ays With alld W:lthout Alerting Tone
The next itt.m concerned tilt-, use of a f]:lshh}g versus a nonflashtng display
and tile use of an auditory alerting tone. A grid was presented showing differ-
ent systems and urgency few+is (table V). Subjects went through the grid twice,
f/rst making an X for :my system,.} they w.uld want for warnings of a given
urgency level, aud tlu+ second time m::Jl<ing:m A for any systems they would
want for a given urgency It+,vel if a slng]c audio :_lertlng tone were presented
+at the same. lintel. The rt_sults for a warning on tile bottom line of a CRT are
shown in flgure 6. '.rhl, "llt+tflashing" vt+rs]oll i,_+most desired for low-urgency
warnJ.ngs, whi'lt, the autlto tent; .is nt_t c,m..lidt'l+t.,<l particularly helpful for any
pl+t,+rity. When [lilt, SalllO WaTlllllg IS flar;i_iltg, ht+wtwt,r, tile preferences move to+
prJt,rIty 2 with ;tudio al+,rt [np :lntl l t, pl-i_)ritv 3 without.
,Nu'ytt ctnlsldl,r fiFurt, ?, "w;lrnih L ,,_,will,l,, (IRT ,%CI+CCII. '_ I_l£'ll this is not
fla;_l_ing, t-h_, prt,ft, ri.,ncc+< ,,,,ntt,r ,+rt,t.ld l,rl¢,rilv 21 be.it wh<,ll it i.'-_ flashing,
tilt++ t)lt'l-t.rt,llcc.q is)v., it+ l+*l'{++l+]Ix+' l, il_t' l;+_,.+t .iF'ill IliFJIt ,_:.xtcty items. For
tl..+_;¢ , 1}1¢. +itllll_ .llt, rtirlg I,m_. _,[..;o Ilc,_.l,t,:; is.l,, J,,,_;it:lhlc.
:+A]-I-m'lt,'lilll ;'t+{'It,mt,tl it+ ,Itlt,l,+It it,+, ilt,'Irl-',t-; i:-; ;I tlirctl ¢lut)t;itlt)l+I from the
tplt,P.'t it._li:ti r_,.
++'.' h
O0000008-TSF07
II' it
FIKuru 8 tdlowH tht_ r't,mlltf-_ ]c,r a "f_l_tg),, lJ.,. t_! tw.,lw, 3/4.-in.-hi).i, ,'Jlplia-
nUlIK_.I:';LCB."Agaln, v/hun l_c)tflaHlllzD:;It I_ vlq.wl,d:,_4a d_,vi_:_,l_,J}Jlt'_iulll-lhl',
nm:inal iP.forlllal:ion(_i-.lu_ii_vJLa[ warnlllg_i,inl_JJty 3 (Jr l,,,l_,w;JJlII_I:;raIl_,,
t||ohlghe_t prJorIty ll.Hm_. I.i!l.llJ_ua,_;c,,If.,:i._ll,_ttmt, l.,r(,lu_,:;.'_'t.ptld_It,;m
an alol:t.:J.ngduvlcu. It I;h,ul]dI., ll_,tc,d t-.lllll_ii., _J II.,dt,lm,m_lr,'_ll,m glv_,l:t()
the lilt_bjcctscol}:_.lstudof Jll.i_Lt',dl_m_ uf uxa_'tly tl_uIlt,th_t,_,_:y:;tum_,.Tht,v
woro shown by video tapt, (m a 12.7-era (5-:I..) by 14.0-cm (q.!).-In.) (Jl_'J'im,llll_l_
and by color sl:Idu._ioi the l'2-;_llflmmm_t,_Jul,]o,'ku,.;t,din llJgl_l_,. ll.,I:V_-99(}
at Ames Rl}_t21lr(th (:(!l}_uF, Stlr|)l'|H|ll_._]y_ 11o _lgllJJJ(.';lll|. (liffur{,n,'{,;_ i. r(,_ij||)ll_.-it,H ,,-..
we_'e noted bt,.twoetl tilL: "(.|t:mt.qlp;t.r;tL[()l}-|"ir_L" ,lind "([t|t,,q[ J(nll|;t_l't,.-I il':;t" gl'l_Ulm
foe those it(uns.
Vo,i('c'Warn] rigs
Another group of questions concerned voice warnlng system_;, A technoJog[-
rally possible future system was descz']l_edJn which c:ach of thc, present aural
warnings would be replaced by a voice warning wlth a dlfferc.nt voice message
for each different malfunctlon. The descrlptlon Is reproducud below.
It would be possible to replace all of the current aural warnings wlth
voice warnings. Such a system would be able to haw: d|fft_rent voice
warnings for unsafe conditions which are now signaled by the same
aural warning, e.g. TAKE-OFF warning and CABIN PRESSURE warning. Such
a system would also include a volume control to adjust to different
listening conditions. The warnings would be presented to your headset
at the same volume as your own adjusted volume level for AT(; communica-
tions. As a back-up, the warnings would also be presented over a
speaker with their volume auto_atically adjusted to be just sufll-
ciently above the volume of the ambient cockpit noise so you would
hear them clearly -- as the noise level changed, the w)lume ol the
warnings would be automatically adjusted up or down. A visual status
display would also be included to display all unsafe conditions as
long as they continued to e_ist. You would have the option of leaving
the visual display on continuously or turning it o,aonly when you
wanted to look at it. There would be a cancel button for w, tce
warnings.
In response to the question_ "Would you want such a system in your cockpit?",
far more pilots said they would want the proposed wJice warning system. ELghty-
two percent of the 50 pilots gave a "yes" or a "qualii led yes" response whilu
• only 18 percent responded "no." This difference was higlily slguIl;cant a.,;
tested by the 50-Percent Probabilltv test (x = 9, n = 50, p • 0.002).
The pilot responses to the proposed volc_,warning system were l,_,tt'l_tla[ly
among the most susceptlble to possible Influt,nce from thu dumon,,;tratit,_,l
experimental synthesized speech and text di'.;pl.:';. I. figure, t_, lll_._t.:.l._,_:_t,.',
of the questionnaire-flrst gr,,up art, shown _,n t left, and tl.,st' _,! Ill,'
demonstration-first group are shuwn t,. tilt-. _ ight The. 1,r,fl,,,rl i,,m; ,,t "vc:-'"
(including "qualified yes") it) "rlo" rt"sp_Ul:_t':; Wt'l_' tic'allY idt'tlt, i, ,tI t,,r t}_(' tw,.,
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l-:r_,,q,_i.,The, ,rely imm)Iblc, dllft,r(,m,(, l.>tw,.,(,nthe two grOUlm udgllt b(, In el..,
II. 0.)fiIIpr_g.)rl'l,m ,,J "qu:il.ifl_d }q,l-i"i'pl-IlJOllrltqIg'Iv()n. A r_.l_lil]orpl)_'clqlllli-_l,of y -
l.(.q,(,l.l(':-If(,F lhl' d(,inonlll.r;itlon-|Ignt grmq_ Win'(."qu_lllf|od yml" ruI_iJ_)tmef-).
TI., i)II()I._I)) lh,)qu,,litlonn:i-l)',,-IIrlil.grmH), h,)wpw,r, wprc.,r,,Hp.l|dJng nn th(..
I,_i_11;(,I.)),,prl,u" (,_pm_.l(:ne,_wllh th,, (:apabl llI I(,IIo| (,lpet-rOll.lCvole(;,warning
llll_',,ll,"lJlily _',)IHH_I'I)III__)|.hi','h.r:wf(,rl.(_l',l('.I_(,f ) pFopl)lll'dvo|('l.)Wl.lI'l}]l}_Hyl|l-(.,111}.
, '1'1)1_, I11 1.11Fll, IziHII.d hllvp ,'/llllll,d lilOrp i)|" l-ll,,l_,, pl]()l.,_ t:() give a "qu_lll|.|t,d yu_I"
i'L'l:lpllil_-n.' l','llljll||]lql 111 lh,' ,|,!lli,_lllll.|:ll J,)n.-,|[rl-_l gl'i)llp. Jh_wew._r, thil_ lll.q)nr(,nt
dtl.i,._',.,m,(. I,,Iva,e)_ I.I1(_ two p,rmtlm wm_ ii11|. _-_]£,llJlluant. tltl HhoWll by I"JHht)l')ll ttqtt
(:_-. B_ I, ,' 3) (, ': I'.!, (l _; 18i, p ',' 11.115). _.
Th(, m'_l' qut,_;t l()n was (le(_ lgllod t o del:t_|;ml m: whl e,II feat ures or c.ml),)m,nts
()f lh(, l)_'()l)(me,[ vole.(, Wal'll.]lll, ) (.iy,qltqil wore )-u,l-q)ou)}I])Io for pr,)due|llg '°yet4'° or
"(foal lJ J.(,.(l you" rPSl)Olhqe_l I.() the _yHt(,lll, F,Igur(, I0 shows the pel;ce|It, age of
"(,sl;e,lli.'J.;ll" jtld_._tll(,it|l_; l'ei!e.lv(_d by (_,_lch voJc(. ) waffling l)ys|:('lll compouunt, 'Pheue
r¢_sp,)nw:,,_ were given by thu_ 41 pilots who had responded affirmatively to the
p_:opo,'_ed x vstem, l,',ac.h p.tlot plaee, d a check beside e.ach component he thought
W_tS ,_'88_,tll:Ja]to make the voice warning system acceptable. The differences in
numbers of "essential" Judgments for the dlfferunt components were highly sig-
nifl.c:mt. (X2 = 54, df = 6, p < 0.005). Clearly, the two most essential compo-
nents are the voice cancel button (55 percent) and the visual status display
(63 pore:eat). We interpret this to mean that pilots want voice warnings only
: if they can cancel them and only if they have a visual status display that will
continue, to make the warning information awlilable. Each of the remaining com-
:!'.'. pom mts received some "essential" -judgments, but in each case, from less than
_', 50 percent of the pilots. These other components should certainly be regarded
': as desirable. In contrast, the voice cancel button and the visual status dis-
play have to be included in any voice warning system.
.b
•'; F±gure. Ii also supports the finding that pilots want to be able to cancel
;. voice warnings. In this question, they were asked to choose among several
types of voice warning repetition; 77 percent of the pilots wanted the warnings
:. to repeat until, they pressed a cancel button or the problem was corrected,
i_ whichever happened first, This compares to only 19 percent who wanted the
.. warnings repeated a fixed number of times --once, twice, ._three times- and
a mere 4 percent who thought voice warnings should be noncancellable. These9
_ 2
_<: differences were highly significant by X_ tests (X " 44.8, df = 2, p < 0.001).
-:
_" The pilots as a group expreused no strong preference on the question con-
=_,: cerning the effect of warning urgency on the type of voice warning repetition.
Figure 12 shows that 39 percent of the pilots thought the type of repetition
=,:. shouid depend on urgency level, while 61 percent thought urgency should not
:, at f_'('t the rept:tttJon of w)tce warnings. This difference was not significant
as t('slud by the 50-Percent Probability test (x = 18, n = 46, p :. 0.10).
=::; (Finn- p.llot_ did not rt.tq)ond tt, th:i:) question.) Those pilots who felt voice
w:trtlJng rtq_,.:tlthm sh.uld depu, nd on warning urgency wanted more repetitions
' ;uld/,)r more t-;tr;ingt,nt cancel ] at ion contlt t ions for high priority warnings than
i_ for tow, r prtorlty warnings.
? I) ,) ()
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'l'l., pl, altm _;_1,,,+_tl-._,lr prt, ft,r_,nt:pr_ for t:hc' um..s af _mIc_-, wiirlllrw, s 1
(£1g. |'l), I, srl_!, lh+' al;mb+,r _f p:ll.t_tH wtm rt_Hpnlltlvd lltf.trmafllvt, ly I-o ,.flit, t_r
Inert+ ,,f I;h+, pJ+qml-_,,d llll/,lt felt VII.IcI+ +-tlJi-'['|;l'l}{ I Hpt'cJf'lc pl:t]I) lullll lllllflodliltp i
,'lcl;lUll. ;)r "utht_r" +--w;_t_ c_,lllp/ll-4._d l;t_ tilt, llulnbor of pl.l.ol;t+ wh. 1;t,l.lpUlldud "dulltL
Illql.," _ltJlA:<,. 'l'hi_l l.llW, _ ratl,_ .f /42 pilot-. Ft-,ltpolldillg aflJ.rllllltlv_:ly LtJ _Jlll.y 1
3 pl I_tll rpnpo.dliw ",lnn'L urn,." Thlf-i d:Iflor¢,llco wat_ h:lghiy signjf:lcant ,,m
tt._Lod I,,v the 50,--lq,rt't,lll. lJr_d:,,'lb/l:lty _,¢+t. (x m 3, n m 46_ p ." 0.002). 4 NaLt,
thlll- th,,' 6-'llt'l'Cl'll_ "di,lllt LII-tI'" rl,t-lpollttL'lt UOIIlpill_e rollgll]y Wtk|l [.lie r¢,sp_mH¢,/+ tu i
_l+u, pr+qmlted w._ic_, W;il:ll]+ll_i I_yHLuIll whorp 18 percent of the 50 l>t,l<,_14 l't+,F.lpotld¢+,d
"no." ',l,'h:lt_ can lu, talu,n ,._ an :lnt_,rna.l ero_+_acheck of the earlier finding that
pl.l<)ts guuer+il'ly art+ Ill l'aw, r of LhtP OL+lldOp.l" of Volvo warl+lings. ,.-,
A t:hrt_t,..w+_y COltlp+li'Jf-lon O[ l++IJot affirmative responses I:u the three proposed
£unctluns _)f vole'us--alerting, teL1 specific problem, and toil immudlate
actions- also resulted in slgnlf]cant differences in preferences (X2 = 6.75,
df m 2, p < 0.05). Mostly, the pilots wanted voice warnings to tell them the
specific problem (78 percent). In addi£1on, 64 pe2cent wanted an alerting word
such as "warning." Only 36 percent wanted to be told immediate action Items.
Under "other" uses (12 percent), suggestions were made by a few pilots that
checklist items or immediate action items should be available on demand by
voice or CRT display. These responses imply that a voice warning format con-
sisting of an alerting word followed by a statement of the specific problem
would be acceptable to most pilots.
Age and Position Flown
Neither age nor position flown resulted in significant dilferences for
acceptability of the proposed voice warning system nor in the pilot ratings of
the proposed text warning systems. Fisher's test for differences between
younger (21 to 40 yr) and older (41 to 60 yr) pilots for the number of "yes"
and "no" responses to the voice warnin_ system yielded a = 5, b = 3, c = 19,
d = 23, and p > 0.05. Similarly, a X_ test for position flown (captain, first
officer, or flight engineer) by number of "yes" and "no" responses yielded
X2 = 1.09, df = 2, p > 0.10.
The sums of individual pilot ratings for the five proposed visual text
systems were also compared for the same younger and older pilot groups using
Wilcoxon's sum of ranks test (nA = 16, nR = 16, nB = 24, R = 305, z = 0.63,
p > 0.I0). And, finally, a 3 x 2 comparison of position flown by low (7 to ]3)
versus high (14 to 19) sums of ratings for the proposed visual text systems
resulted in no significant effect for position flown (X2 = 4.45, df = 2,
p > 0.i0).
i
4Four of the 50 pilots did not respond to this item. Assuming they had
checked "don't use" the ratio of 43:7 would still have been significant at
the 0.002 level.
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-: fl(:_m_ntte DJ ffor(,)) t:l o !
T|io. aDa].yfllfl of pilot r(_f)pon_mo to Cllu tlomontlc dlli(.,)-(,.1 ll)l o li)_) r(,v,.;,l,,d
atron8 agro(_mont omen8 pilots regarding the f(mtur,m ()_ II)(, ,llii)'J_,,))l w;,)J)I))_,,
• eone..,opto. _'or them> readers unfamlll_r wlth thin I.nt)'.))),,))), lh,, r;(,).m)! i('
dlfforong;lal i. a t(,e.hniqu_ plono¢_rod by (-)t)good ll) I!)57 (),,i. tD. II i))
8enor_1,1y t|nofu], for f:l,nd;|ng r(.la_ed eone_,ptn I. a (l.lv,,r)),, (,()l l_,(,l I())). l), s,_i(,.
osch connopg or ,Item to be Judged _ p.lau(,d al: tl),_ lop ()f _) i)_0;( , whl(,h I,m, _,
number of polar oppoaite o_a1.(m. The (;on(;O,l)tt) um, d h(,ru w(.,i',., o,II w;iv))l))l;-
!
related i, tt:mfl (table Vl). The _calu_) aru _how. :In tal)il,, VII. ,u )1(,,,I(_ w,,)',,
given a 19-pase booklet,, I pa[lu of ImJtruct,lom) an,l I._ l)a);(,I), ,,_i(,h wllll ()))(, -'
concept. They plac_d ml X on uach "/,-point: _cal(.,, e.l._)(,i [_) _)))(, ()I II)(, i,(,l_il
opposite adjectives or the other) d(_,pundlng (,n gilt, eli(! l.hi,y l_,ll. Ill,, v(.i,'(,l,[
was most closely related to. If it was ,mru].atod) or _'v,lal.,,d to l)()l.h _i,.l.](,(.l ,Iv, u)
by the same amount, they placed an X in the mlddle spact, ()n th,, m";i!(,.
Data from the semantic dlfferentlal are usua1_ly 'ma.lyzed _-)ev(_;ra] w,'k_m.
The analyses presented here involve mean responses ol a l] p:[lott)on t,ach _)cale
for each concept. _wo-way comparisons between pairs of warning co_)et,pt,,)are
shown in figures 14(a) through (g). Figure 14(g)) for example, shown that
when "VASI lights" is compared to "Whoop) whoop) pull up) pull up," the |ights
are less startling) more informative) far more beautiful) more valuable, more
passive, far more quiet) and far more soothing. The useful conclu/;lon, then,
is that to startle and annoy one would use "whoop, whoop, pull up." '['opr,,sent
informative unobtrusively) one would use VASI lights.
Further use of the semantic differential for evaluation of experimental
cockpit warning systems seems warranted. Factor analysis teehnlquas are
expected to extract groups of warnings that have similar values on the 17 polar
opposite scales and to determine how factors such as evaluation, utility, and
intensity characterize the different types of warnings. The aim is to standard-
ize a set of semantic differential scales which could be used to characterize a
new warning system in relation to existing systems merely by having pilots fly
a simulation of the new system and then fill out a semantic differential
booklet.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Several conclusions can be drawn from the data analyzed and presL'ntud, it
Was shown that preferred warning methods depend on urgency oz prlorlty of the
warned condition, and that false-alarm rate has a ma_or impact on th(' preferred
presentation mode. For example) these data would indlcatv that, If a sy_t,,m
has an inherent high false-alarm rate, a vlsual warning method such a8 1,fl),,It,d
lights or a CRT is preferable to any audio system. If a low falt_e-alavm r_,tv
can be achieved) the audio systems, particularly voice, aru pre[_,rablt,t()
. visual systems for high priority warnings.
• It can be inferred from these data that pilots wou_d llkv a limit_,dl)rl-
ority assignment scheme, that all warnings which are current :_ho.ld I)(,dl;q)lqv(,d
somewhere, and that the pilot should decide the eour,,_,:, of actl,m v,_t_)vr th;m
• •
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b_ng told what to do. llow_wor,wlthln thot_obroad guldolinos, much more wor_
m'4ntbe dont_to drfino the priority assignment _chomos toldto optlmlz.othe
warning displays. Candidat(_ schom,_t_ and dlspl,lys must b,, thoroughly _vstod _n
simulations and _n fl.ight boforn they arc recommended for airline uric.
It hat_ also boon shown that profern,d conch:Us:ion optiontl depend m_
whether I;hv warning lf_ auditory, visual, or tactll-r, at-t well an on the pr,lorlry
or urgency of the warning, Tit[., data In figure 3 w111 allow a zholco of the
preferred cm_collatlon option, gJw,n the priority anti warning mode.
l,'lnally, the results of thitl t_tudy show that a tJystomatic, obiloctlw, sea- -'
suromtmt of pllot preferences £or warn:tngsystem desl[_nreveals consistency
and strong agreemt_nt among this smnple of .line pilots. Wldle the user cannot
entirely dictate the system design, especially in airline cockpits whore regu-
latory and cost considoratlons are so important, it would seem useful to
include input from experienced line pilots in the development of aircraft
warning systems for civil transport aircraft. The subjects whoso collective
opinlw is represented by the data presented h_re have much and varied experl-
once .lying zn different _nvironments and aircraft types, and this should be
given due regard in the design of future warning systems.
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'L'ALtLE I.- BACKGROUND AND I_PERTI.'_N_I_ OF 5Q I)ILOTI_
P_QSIT_O_N__FL (3WN, ,A IRI-!_N[:__ _30U.]_.l::_ FJ,p_WN._
CAPTAIN 13 AMFRICAN _0 INTERNATIONAL
FIR_ITOFFICER 20 PAN AM I;I DOMI-_TIC
FLIf_HT ENI31NFLN 14 IINIT[D 1 ,qI-I(]RI HAIJL
OTHI_R 3 WI_ST[RN Li CHART[,R ..,
I LYING ]I(IERS 4 IREI(IHT
TWA 2 I ERNY
HUGttt._ All1 1
BII"IDAIR 1
OTHER/FURLOUGH 2
AGE (yr) TOTAL TIME (hr)
YOUNGEST MEAN OLDEST LEAST MEAN MOST
27 41,3 00 500 9,300 30,000
=j TABLE II.- URGENCY SCALE USED IN QUESTIONNAIRE
TYPE OF PROBLEM
k.' 1 IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED BY CREWTO SAVEAIRCRAFT
IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED BY CREWAS SOON2
; AS AIRCRAFT IS STABLE
i ....
! 3 ACTION REQUIRED ASSOONAS TIME AVAILABLE
4 ACTION REQUIRED LATER IN THE FLIGHT'
FLIGHT PLANNING MAY BE AFFECTED
ABNORMAL EVENTSSIGNALED FORINFO ONLY;
NO ACTION REQUIRED MAY AFFECT FLIGHT PLANNING
: 630
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TAti]+E 1!I,- WANhI1N(+ METJIOD_ AS III':I,,IIH,',IJ IH QUI'dfJ'IL(INNA]RE
IYPt_ t XAMPI I:fi
MHfllCAI+ flOUND_ TONE_, CHIMI;_, CHOtIDfl
_" OTHEN NON-
"" 8PI_ECtt I_OUNDS I:II:I,L_, CLACKI.:R_, Iff]l(Nfi, BII//| I_
_.. VOICE fI.ECTHONIC NPFECI-I (lIKE HAL IN ;)001
_' ()H LII([- (]PW_ VOICt) " '
,': LIGHTS WITIt LIGHTS WITH PRINTI_D LABI__t.S,ALL
: t.ABEL_ COLORS, ,_TEADY OR PLASItlNG
i.t
,, UGHTSWiTH.............................................................................PLAIN,UNLAB_L_D _ TS,ALLCOLORS,
i' NO LABELS STEADY OR FLASHING
i l SCREEN OR AN ALPItANUMERIC DISPt.AY
BLOCK
FLAGS MECHANICAL FLAGS IN FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS,
DISPLAY COVERS, DOLL'S EYES
TACTILE STICK SHAKERS, RUDDER SHAKERS, SEAT
BOUNCERS
TABLE IV.- TYPICAL PREFERENCE GRID FOR WARNING METHODS
50 FALSE ALARMS PER 1 REAL ALARM
URGENCY LEVEL SOUND SOUND LIGHT LIGHT MESSAGE
1 2 3 4 5 6 8
1 IMMEDIATE ACTION
TO SAVE AIRCRAFT
! I
2 IMMEDIATE ACTION
AFTER AIRCRAFT
STABLE
3 ACTION WHEN
POSSIBLE
IL Iiii i ......4 ACTION LATER
5 NO ACTION/
INFORMATION I
ONLY ._. I _._
- :,t
i'
_'
I.
_.J_'l", R1 II "'"1" ............................... TT " ' "- tl_ .... t,, ",', ,,',rl,,,,,,_ ....................... - ....... I I1"11
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'I'AliJ,F V,-, PIH,;F],;Id",NC),,'C]RID USED FOR I;LASIIINC/NOT l,'V"_".l_,tlllNC
AND ALIlllO ALERT QUESTION
1 2 3 4 5
IMMEDIATE ACTION ACTION ACTION INFO
WARNINGSYSTEM ACTION WHEN WHEN LATER ONLY
STABLE STABLE
_W_Ai_iiNG ON BOT'rOM'LINE OF
CRT- -N(:}T FLASHING "='
WARNINGON BOTTOMLINE OF
CRT- -FLASHING 3/sec
WARNINGON WHOLECRT SCREEN-
-NOT FLASHING,BUT WHATEVERWAS
DISPLAYEDBEFOREIS REMOVED
WARNINGON WHOLECRT SCREEN- -............... =!
-FLASHING, AND WHATEVERWAS I
DISPLAYEDBEFOREIS REMOVED I/
SINGLE LINE OF 123/4" HIGH ............. [- I
ALPHANUMERICS--NOT FLASHING : I
SINGLE LINE OF 123/4" HIGH
ALPHAr.UMERICS- -FLASHING 3
TIMES/see
--- , , ,
TABLE Vl.- SE_LANrlC DIFFERENTIAL TABLE Vll.- SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL
CONCEPTS USED SCALES USED
Altitude alert tone Startling --- Tranquilizing
3/4-1n.-square yellow light, flashing Informative --- Dls:racting
3/4-1n.-hlgh alphanumeric display, Good --- Bad
not flashing Ugly --- Beautiful
3/4-1u.-diameter red light, flashing Soft --- Hard
3/4-1n.-square yellow light, not Stroug --- Weak
flashing Worthless --- Valuable
Synthesized speech Loud --- Soft
3/4-1n.-dlameter red light, not Unpleasant --- Pleasant
flashing Hot --- Cold
3/8-1n.-high lettering on a CRT Nice ....Awful
Whoop, whoop, pull up, pull up Dark --- Bright .
ATC controller Active --- Passive
Mechanical flag in glideslope Noisy --- Quiet
• indicator Safe --- Dangerous
Engine fire bell Alerting --- Imperceptible
3/8-in. blue light, not flashing Annoying --- Soothing
Stick shaker j
SEL CAL tone
VASI lights
REIL lights
Gear horn
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I
WARNING METHOD PREFERENCES
NUMBER OF
AFFIRMATIVE
RESPONSES
MUSICAL 24
SOUNDS 16
32 _..
i OTHER 24
SOUND 16
a _
32
VOICE 16
8
Im,mmmmm
32
LABELLED 24
LIGHT 16
8
32
24UNLABELED
LIGHT 16
32
TEXT 24
24
FLAG 18
I
32
24
_ TACTILE 16 _
1 2 3 4 5
URGENCY ACT ... _ INFO
• LEVEL NOW _" ONLY
FALSE_LARM RATE
D _:1 !_11:.o [] 1:10oo Dl:loe
Figure I.- Number of affirmative responses to warning methods
as a function of warning urgency and false-alarm rate.
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i I
i i i
eli.+
VOICE WARNING
PRIORITY 1 - ACTION NOW
I,<.-',,-,,_:<,-.._ , ,',"'_j//J..,I.U I',_.al3ti>>'v_',lFl'///i////.,/ill/!
> 20 - I:-'_',k,Y'-','-.'.,_;,'_.",?'.:,'Yh','/W/,t
-- !:,%"' :,: t _'_',""l qF/,"/i/,,',.",,'.,v'/,,', "'/I
_,Y_II)?,._J ", "k'-ll_i _,,'|"/l107,"//i!!I11
% I_L_*l¢l_ "¢ • .' '/ ,' ,l'i .'t' •
_l_. _ #%¢ _.,%.% I //#t*,,',_] +,','] _
'< 10 "i:.7_i':'.:,'::,::.::::::.>:,:{; , -,.',,-. ..... ],.v,'
)_,'_, ",+',,'L,k__, ..,,.; _, .-.,.,"' ../.vk'x'x"x"x'x'_';v. 'Z_'.-_;,>,."l"h'i./,.,Z..!?.;':.(,'l
_'#_l # %*.% .+,. I_, , t/, .'/ ., /
ua_ i'!SZ.!_".:,::',:?.[".'_"_:_ ^ .__._..._x ;'<"",-,,_G-.,._..,. , >,-..,_ ,v,.,"/f"f,.,,,7!,."//71
m __ >5.',',2h;-.",1'?;,'.'77./,?/,/,.','/_
...........................i.>?>'Z4_,i ,,_C',-i','."l ',,'Vv'/,'/ "',0
.-,, 50:1 1:50 1:1000 1:106
FALSE-ALARM RATE
Figure 2.- Voice warning --priority I cell of warning
_: method preferences figure.
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